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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-3754
____________
KATHY NAVAS,
               Appellant
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-03677)
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 3, 2008
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 13, 2008 )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Kathy Navas appeals the District Court’s order, which affirmed the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
2§§ 401-433.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the order of the District
Court.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Navas was born on November 28, 1949.  She is a high school graduate with
vocational training in computer programming.  She last worked in April 2000 as an
assistant buyer, a job which involved light exertion.  She suffers from subtle and
minimally degenerative spondylosis, bulging and herniated discs, and obesity.  She has
received various treatments for her ailments, including physical therapy, steroidal
injections, and a variety of medications.
Navas filed an application for disability insurance benefits on September 26, 2001,
alleging that she had been disabled since April 22, 2000.  Her claim was denied in 2002. 
Navas filed her current application for disability insurance benefits on September 22,
2003, again alleging that she had been disabled since April 22, 2000.  Her claim was
denied, and Navas requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  The
hearing took place on December 29, 2004, and both Navas and Dr. Mark Zibelman, her
physician, testified.
A claimant’s residual functional capacity is “the most [a claimant] can still do1
despite [her] limitations.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
3
Navas claimed that she had to leave her job in April 2000 due to back pain caused
by a motorcycle accident.  She testified that she could stand or walk for approximately
fifteen minutes and could sit up to one hour before she experienced pain.  Dr. Zibelman
began treating Navas’s back pain in May 2000.  In November 2000, she sought treatment
from him because she had been involved in a second motorcycle accident.  He continued
to treat her throughout 2001.  Dr. Zibelman reported that in October 2001 the plaintiff
could stand for approximately ten minutes, could walk around “a little bit,” and “limp[ed]
into the office every visit.”  Dr. Zibelman stated that he did not measure Navas’s range of
motion, administer a straight leg test, or note that Navas had an abnormal gait in his
treatment records.
The ALJ concluded that Navas was not disabled.  She found that, although Navas
suffered from a severe impairment, she retained the residual functional capacity  to1
perform her previous job as an assistant buyer, which required light work.  The Appeals
Council denied Navas’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner.  Navas sought judicial review of the
ALJ’s decision, and the District Court denied her petition for review.  Navas filed this
timely appeal.
4II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the ALJ’s decision
to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion . . . .  It is more than a mere scintilla but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.”  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.
Navas had the burden of proving that she was disabled, including that her
impairments rendered her incapable of performing her past relevant work.  See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A).  In evaluating whether a claimant has demonstrated that she is disabled,
the ALJ considers whether the claimant:  (1) is currently employed; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has an impairment which meets or is equal to the requirements of a listed
impairment; and (4) can perform past relevant work, or (5) is able to perform other work,
considering her age, education, and work experience.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(i)-(v). 
Where, as here, a claimant has a severe impairment, but the impairment does not qualify
as a listed impairment, “the Commissioner assesses in the fourth step whether, despite the
severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform h[er] past
5work.”  Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 401 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Navas argues that the ALJ failed to define her sitting, standing, and walking
limitations in terms of her residual functional capacity.  However, the ALJ explicitly
defined Navas’s limitations, stating:
[F]or the relevant period in question, the claimant retained the residual
functional capacity to perform the functional demands of a restricted range
of light level exertional work, or work which requires maximum lifting of
twenty pounds and frequent lifting of ten pounds (20 C.F.R. § 404.1567). 
More specifically, . . . [the] claimant was incapable of performing postural
activities with more than occasional regularity; was incapable of climbing
ladders, ropes and scaffolds; and was incapable of dealing with
concentrated exposure to extremes of cold and heat.
Moreover, by finding that Navas could perform light work, the ALJ implicitly found that
she could work at a job that involves “a good deal of walking or standing,” or a job that
“involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).  Therefore, we reject Navas’s argument that the ALJ did not
define her limitations in assessing her residual functional capacity.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
